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No. 106
The Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac crisis may have
been the most avoidable financial crisis in histo-
ry. Economists have long complained that the
risks posed by the government-sponsored enter-
prises were large relative to any social benefits. 
We now realize that the overall policy of pro-
moting home ownership was carried to excess.
Even taking as given the goal of expanding home
ownership, the public policy case for subsidizing
mortgage finance was weak. The case for using
the GSEs as a vehicle to subsidize mortgage
finance was weaker still. The GSE structure serves
to privatize profits and socialize losses. And even
if one thought that home ownership was worth
encouraging, mortgage debt was worth subsidiz-
ing, and the GSE structure was viable, allowing
the GSEs to assume a dominant role in mortgage
finance was a mistake. The larger they grew, the
more precarious our financial markets became. 
Regulators should contemplate freezing the
mortgage purchase activities of the GSEs while
at the same time loosening the capital require-
ments for banks to hold low-risk mortgages.
The result would almost surely be an industry
much less concentrated than the current duop-
oly. A housing finance system that does not rely
so heavily on Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will
be more robust.
We have to assume that sooner or later some
of the institutions involved in mortgage finance
will fail. The policy should be to promote a hous-
ing finance system where mortgage risk is spread
among dozens of institutions. That way, the fail-
ure of some firms can be resolved through merg-
ers and orderly restructuring, without exposing
the financial system to the sort of catastrophic
risk that is represented by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
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Introduction
The United States Congress has a genius
for creating government programs that are
difficult to terminate. For example, with
Social Security and Medicare, there is no way
to cut taxes on current workers without
threatening the benefits of current recipients.
There is no pool of accumulated assets that
can be used to pay beneficiaries, the myth of
trust-fund accounting notwithstanding.
Similarly, the mortgage market duopoly of
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which five years
ago held over half of the outstanding mort-
gage debt in the United States, is difficult to
terminate. They cannot be merged with other
financial institutions, because those other
institutions lack the special borrowing privi-
leges that the government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) enjoy.
In fact, the reaction of Congress to the cri-
sis created by subprime mortgage defaults was
to expand the role of the GSEs in mortgage
finance. Each mortgage purchased by one of
the GSEs would have been limited to no more
than $417,000, except for emergency legisla-
tion last December raising the limit to
$729,750. Indeed, in the first quarter of this
year, the GSEs funded 70 percent of new mort-
gages.
Early in July, there was an abrupt collision
between congressional intent and market
reality. On July 9, Bloomberg reported that:
Fannie Mae paid a record yield over
benchmark rates on $3 billion of two-
year notes amid concern that the U.S.
mortgage-finance company doesn’t
have enough capital to weather the
biggest housing slump since the Great
Depression.
The 3.25 percent benchmark notes
priced to yield 3.27 percent, or 74 basis
points more than comparable U.S.
Treasuries, the Washington-based com-
pany said today in an e-mailed state-
ment. That’s the biggest spread since
Fannie Mae first sold two-year bench-
mark notes in 2000 and triple what it
paid in June 2006.1
The story goes on to note that the market was
treating the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac as if it were rated A2 by Moody’s. The
actual rating on the debt is AAA, and histori-
cally investors priced it that way. But, alarmed
by large losses and thin capital shields at the
GSEs, investors began to contemplate the risk
of a GSE default.
Once this risk was priced into their debt
instruments, the two firms’ borrowing costs
soared, placing them in jeopardy.
The loss of confidence in the GSEs, which
spread to the stock market, could quickly have
driven them into bankruptcy. Had the Treasury
and Congress failed to act, a GSE default would
have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The con-
sequence of the hastily passed late-summer leg-
islation is that if the housing market gets worse
or if it turns out that the less-than-transparent
portfolios of the GSEs contain hidden weak-
nesses, taxpayers could be liable for tens of bil-
lions of dollars in shortfalls.
In this briefing paper, I will suggest ways
that Congress could gradually extricate hous-
ing policy from its dependence on the GSEs.
While it may be too late to insulate taxpayers
from the risks embedded in the GSEs’ current
portfolios, it is possible to shrink the GSEs
without significantly damaging the housing
market.
Three questions are worth examining:
1. What policies might have prevented the
crisis?
2. How does the recently passed legisla-
tion deepen government involvement
in housing finance?
3. Going forward, how could government
extricate itself and the GSEs from a dom-
inant role in the housing market?
An Avoidable Crisis
The GSE crisis may have been the most
avoidable financial crisis in history. Economists
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How Do the GSEs Work?
The GSEs operate in what is called the secondary mortgage market. That is, they
purchase mortgage loans from other sources. As a home buyer, you cannot obtain a
mortgage directly from Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. Instead, you obtain your loan from
someone in the primary mortgage market (a bank or a mortgage banker), and that
lender sells the loan to one of the GSEs. The GSEs then combine your mortgage loan
with similar loans into what are called mortgage pools. These pools are formed into
pass-through securities, meaning that the principal and interest on the mortgages in
the pool are passed through to investors in the securities. The GSEs can either sell the
mortgage-backed securities to other investors or retain the securities for themselves. In
the 1990’s, Freddie gradually shifted from a strategy of selling most of its securities to
a strategy of retaining most of its securities. Fannie has always predominantly held its
securities in its portfolio. Whether it retains or sells the security, the GSE bears the
default risk of the mortgages, which is the source of the recent crisis.
The GSEs take responsibility for ensuring that all the principal and interest on the
underlying mortgages is returned to investors, even if the mortgage borrowers them-
selves default on their loans. If a borrower defaults, the loan is removed from the pool.
The GSE pays the full principal amount to the holders of the security and then recov-
ers what it can from a foreclosure sale. When this happens, the GSE typically absorbs a
loss of about half the outstanding principal on the loan. 
The GSEs charge a fee, known as a guarantee fee, that on average is sufficient to cov-
er their losses and provide a profit. If the primary lender offers you a mortgage loan at
an interest rate of 6.75 percent, the GSE may put the loan into a security that pays 6.50
percent. The remaining 0.25 percent is retained by the GSE as its guarantee fee.
GSEs earn profits in two ways. First, the guarantee fee is typically larger than what
is needed to cover the cost of mortgage defaults. This is called their mortgage insurance
business, because the GSEs are providing insurance to investors against mortgage
defaults. Second, when the GSEs retain securities rather than selling them, they earn a
financing profit. If a GSE retains a security that yields 6.50 percent and it can finance
that security by issuing debt that costs only 6.25 percent, then the GSE earns a spread
of 0.25 percent. This is called the portfolio lending business, because the GSEs are man-
aging a portfolio of investments in mortgage securities.
In both the mortgage insurance business and the portfolio lending business, the
GSEs have two important advantages. These advantages are a lower risk premium and
lower capital requirements.
In the capital markets, U.S. Treasury debt is considered risk-free, and every other
borrower pays a higher interest rate than the Treasury. That difference is called a risk
premium. The greater the uncertainty about the borrower’s financial condition, the
higher the risk premium. Because investors believed that the GSEs would not be
allowed to fail, until very recently the risk premium on GSE debt was very low.
The second advantage that the GSEs enjoy is low capital requirements. When banks
engage in the mortgage insurance business or the portfolio lending business, they are
required by their regulators to put more of their shareholders’ funds at risk than the
GSEs are. This makes it difficult for banks to compete with GSEs.
have long complained that the risks posed by
the GSEs were large relative to any social bene-
fits. But the GSEs have used political clout to
beat back attempts to limit their growth.
The growth of the GSEs took place in sev-
eral stages. An approximate timeline of events
is as follows:
• In 1938 the Federal National Mortgage
Association (ultimately nicknamed Fan-
nie Mae) was formed as a government
agency to try to fill some of the gap in the
mortgage lending industry left by the
wave of bank defaults in the Great
Depression.
• In 1968, in part to get Fannie Mae’s lia-
bilities off the government balance sheet,
Fannie Mae was spun off to private
investors.
• In 1970, to deal with regulatory impedi-
ments in getting mortgage money to
California, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (ultimately nick-
named Freddie Mac) was formed as a gov-
ernment agency.
• Throughout the 1970s the role of the
GSEs expanded. The savings and loan
industry, which at the time dominated
mortgage finance, was plagued by disin-
termediation. Regulation Q, which lim-
ited the interest rate that thrifts could
pay to their depositors, was causing an
outflow of funds from the S&Ls. That
was another classic example of a govern-
ment intervention without a viable exit
strategy. Regulation Q was not sustain-
able. However, lifting that regulation
would have raised the thrifts’ cost of
funds, making many of them insolvent.
Ultimately, the regulation was lifted, and
many S&Ls went under, at a cost to tax-
payers of more than $100 billion.
• Regulation Q helped to cause the down-
fall of the S&L industry. However, the
large losses incurred by taxpayers were the
result of flaws in the deposit insurance
system. In response to the losses on the
S&Ls, the government reformed the way
that deposit insurance was implemented.
Regulators corrected some accounting
flaws that had allowed insolvent institu-
tions to continue expanding. Regulators
also made changes to the incentive struc-
ture of deposit insurance, forcing riskier
banks to pay higher premiums. 
• In the early 1980s, as the S&Ls were falter-
ing, Fannie Mae was losing a million dol-
lars a day. Fannie’s problem was rising
interest rates and a portfolio of long-term
mortgages financed in part by short-term
debt. However, Fannie Mae kept growing
as its S&L competitors fell by the wayside,
and when interest rates stabilized and
came down, Fannie Mae became highly
profitable.
• Also in the early 1980s both Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae fed off the carcass-
es of the thrift industry. Freddie and
Fannie engaged in “swap” transactions
that allowed S&Ls to liquidate mort-
gage portfolios without recognizing
losses. In this way, they were able to
expand their lending even as they were
failing. With one hand—the GSEs—gov-
ernment was handing the S&Ls money
to gamble, while with the other hand—
the Resolution Trust Corporation—the
government was absorbing the losses.
• In 1989, Freddie Mac was sold to private
shareholders, just as Fannie Mae had
been in 1968. Freddie Mac proceeded to
grow dramatically, and the two GSEs
held just over 50 percent of all mortgage
debt outstanding in 2003.
• In 1992 Congress created a single regula-
tor, called the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, to oversee Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae.
Congress never explicitly said that it was
designing a mortgage finance system based
on this duopoly. However, strong lobbying
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was suffi-
cient to offset the warnings of many public
officials that the dominance of the GSEs was
unwise.
Concerns about the GSEs spanned the polit-
ical spectrum. Lawrence Summers, Treasury
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Secretary under President Bill Clinton, com-
plained in 1999 of the anomalous status of the
GSEs. When the crisis broke this July, Summers
was understandably bitter. On a web site called
Creative Capitalism, he wrote:
What went wrong? The illusion that the
companies were doing virtuous work
made it impossible to build a political
case for serious regulation. When there
were social failures the companies
always blamed their need to perform for
the shareholders. When there were busi-
ness failures it was always the result of
their social obligations. Government
budget discipline was not appropriate
because it was always emphasized that
they were “private companies.” But mar-
ket discipline was nearly nonexistent
given the general perception—now vali-
dated—that their debt was government
backed. Little wonder with gains priva-
tized and losses socialized that the
enterprises have gambled their way into
financial catastrophe.2
However, Summers was far from a lonely
critic of the GSEs. Lawrence J. White, who
served on the board of the agency regulating
Freddie Mac from 1986 through 1989, wrote
a study for the Cato Institute in 2004 in
which he advocated full privatization of the
GSEs.3 He suggested having the government
disavow any guarantees to GSE investors. 
That same year, in Privatizing Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks:
When and How, Peter J. Wallison, Bert Ely, and
Thomas J. Stanton proposed that steps be
taken to level the playing field so that banks
could compete with GSEs, thereby reducing
the dependency of the housing finance sys-
tem on GSEs. 
In hindsight, knowing what we know
today, we can say that:
1. The overall policy of promoting home
ownership was carried to excess. By 2006,
the demand for housing had boosted
prices to unsustainable levels. However,
Congress was reluctant to restrain the
market. Instead, even though the GSEs
were not supposed to purchase high-risk
mortgages, under pressure from Congress
they bought hundreds of billions of dol-
lars of securities backed by subprime
loans.
2. Even taking as given the goal of expand-
ing home ownership, the public policy
case for subsidizing mortgage finance
was weak. Rather than constituting a
“positive externality,” the heavy load of
mortgage indebtedness posed a major
systemic risk.
3. The case for using the GSEs as a vehicle
to subsidize mortgage finance was weak-
er still. As Summers and others have
pointed out, the GSE structure serves to
privatize profits and socialize losses.
4. Even if one thought that home owner-
ship was worth encouraging, mortgage
debt was worth subsidizing, and the GSE
structure was viable, allowing the GSEs
to assume a dominant role in mortgage
finance was a mistake. The larger they
grew, the more precarious our financial
markets became. It reached the point
where the health of the entire financial
system appeared to depend on the
health of the GSEs.
The Latest Legislation
In July 2008, Congress passed comprehen-
sive legislation aimed at the housing market,
including some provisions pertaining to the
GSEs. The legislation provides for a multi-year
increase in the ceiling on loans eligible for pur-
chase by the GSEs, to $625,000. What is more
important, in order to restore investor confi-
dence in GSE securities, the new law gives the
U.S. Treasury the authority to extend almost
unlimited credit to the GSEs and even to pur-
chase equity in the companies. Lastly, the leg-
islation creates a new independent regulatory
agency to oversee the GSEs.
It appears that the intent of Congress is to
keep the GSEs substantially as they are.
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Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are supposed to
continue to add to their portfolios. As long as
their financial condition does not deteriorate
radically, the management and ownership
structure of the GSEs will remain unchanged.
In short, the new legislation contemplates
business as usual. The GSEs will continue to
serve as the conduit for an indirect subsidy to
home buyers, with GSE shareholders getting
much of the profits and taxpayers bearing
the costs and, most importantly, the risks.
Unwise Approach
Current policy treats the GSEs as essential
to U.S. housing finance. That is an unwise
approach. It makes the housing market unnec-
essarily fragile. It sets up a permanent conflict
between shareholders and taxpayers, to be
mediated by an untried regulatory agency. 
The U.S. mortgage market is the largest
financial market in the world. When two
firms together hold more than one-third of
the outstanding mortgage debt, the entire
financial system is fragile. The risks involved
in mortgage lending would be better spread
among dozens of institutions, rather than
concentrated in the two GSEs. With dozens
of mortgage lenders, the failure of any one
firm could be dealt with through a merger,
rather than forcing the taxpayers to bear the
full brunt of the risk. 
With GSE debt guaranteed by the govern-
ment, there is a conflict between shareholders
and taxpayers. For shareholders, the way to max-
imize profits is to borrow at the nearly risk-free
rate (courtesy of the government’s guarantee) in
order to finance risky lending. The incentive is to
take on a large portfolio with minimal capital.
The goal of protecting taxpayers requires the
opposite: stiff capital requirements, with limits
on portfolio size and risk-taking. Until recently,
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight was charged with implementing capital
regulations. It remains to be seen whether under
a new regulator, called the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, this function will be handled
any more effectively. The FHFA merely takes the
existing personnel out of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Its perma-
nent director will be appointed by the next pres-
ident, and the transition is not expected to be
complete until at least July of 2009.
Alternatives
The attempt to preserve the status quo is
not necessarily the best approach. In a July 27,
2008, newspaper column, Lawrence Summers
compared the Bear Stearns merger with the
housing legislation:
Consider how much more problematic
the Bear Stearns response would have
been had policymakers signalled their
commitment to back the company’s lia-
bilities without limit; left management
in place with no change in the business
model; and allowed dividends to be paid
and shareholders to keep going with
hope for a better tomorrow. Yet all of
these elements are present in the cases
of Fannie and Freddie.4
Summers compared the status quo with
the GSEs to the S&L crisis of the early 1980s,
where the attempt by Congress and regulators
to keep the thrifts going ultimately added to
the taxpayers’ losses. Summers recommends
operating the GSEs as government corpora-
tions for several years. At that time, he would
sell whatever components of the GSEs are
profitable to fully private entities.
I would recommend a strategy that aims
at spreading the mortgage business across a
wider range of financial institutions. In par-
ticular, regulators should contemplate freez-
ing the mortgage purchase activities of the
GSEs while at the same time loosening the
capital requirements for banks to hold low-
risk mortgages.
A freeze would have two beneficial effects.
First, in the event that Freddie or Fannie
becomes insolvent, the failure will be easier to
manage if the firm is smaller, with less uncer-
tainty about the outlook for its mortgage port-
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folio. Second, a freeze would lead to an expan-
sion of the role of banks and other financial
institutions in the mortgage market, ultimately
resulting in a stronger mortgage finance system.
As the GSEs continue to purchase new
mortgages, their portfolios become more dif-
ficult for other firms to assess or to absorb.
New mortgages are the most difficult to assess
in terms of risk. Within a few years, any flaws
in the borrower’s capacity to manage credit
have been exposed, and the initial trend of
home prices in the area has been observed.
Once mortgages have been seasoned for sever-
al years, the default rate is usually predictable.
Assuming that the GSEs’ capital is sufficient
to absorb any losses, it would be possible for the
government, within 5 to 10 years, to credibly
eliminate its guarantee of GSE liabilities. Today,
government cannot limit its guarantee, because
too many security-holders would be adversely
affected. However, in several years, when the
financial condition of the firms will be much
clearer and the size of their obligations will be
much smaller, the blank-check guarantee should
no longer be needed. Once the guarantee is elim-
inated, the GSEs can resume their purchases of
new mortgages. At that point, they would face
the discipline of the capital markets, which
would make it extremely unlikely that their mar-
ket shares would reach dangerously high levels.
What would a GSE freeze do to the mort-
gage market? Other lenders, primarily banks,
would have to step in and bear the default risk
and investment risk of mortgages. They tend
to charge higher rates than the lenders who
sell their loans to the GSEs. This can be seen in
the market for so-called “jumbo” loans, which
are mortgages that are larger than the GSEs’
purchase limits. Historically, jumbo loans
have cost about one-fourth of one percentage
point more than GSE-eligible loans. That
would suggest only a modest impact of losing
the GSE presence in the mortgage market.
More recently, however, as mortgage-backed
investments have acquired a stigma, the spread
between jumbo rates and GSE-eligible rates has
widened to a full percentage point. This sug-
gests that the impact of losing the GSE pres-
ence could be that large.
It might be argued that even an increase of
one-fourth of one percentage point in mort-
gage rates is something that public policy
should seek to avoid. If so, public policy can
avoid that consequence through a number of
means. One approach to consider would be
to modify the capital requirements of banks.
Banks, like the GSEs, have liabilities that are
guaranteed by the U.S. government. Bank de-
posits are insured by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation. Accordingly, banks have
no inherent cost disadvantage relative to the
GSEs in making mortgage loans. However,
banks do have a regulatory disadvantage, based
on differences in capital requirements. Reducing
or eliminating those differences would allow
banks to offer mortgage loans at rates that com-
pete with GSE rates.
The main reason that the GSEs grew to
dominate the market for loans that fit their eli-
gibility criteria is that their capital require-
ments were derived from the default risks of
the mortgage loans. In contrast, banks have to
hold an amount of capital against their mort-
gage assets that is higher, particularly for those
mortgage loans with the lowest default risk.
Bank regulators could, on either a tempo-
rary or permanent basis, reduce the capital
requirements for low-risk mortgages held by
banks. Low-risk mortgages would be mort-
gages where the borrower makes a down pay-
ment of 20 percent, or 10 percent with mort-
gage insurance. These are the loans that are
“conforming loans,” meaning that they fall
within the GSEs’ charters. Reduced capital
requirements would encourage banks to com-
pete more aggressively for those loans, thereby
mitigating some of the impact of a freeze on
new purchases by the GSEs.
One approach might be to reduce the cap-
ital requirements for low-risk mortgages pur-
chased over the next three years, so that the
housing market can start to recover from the
collapse of prices in the past year. After three
years, the capital requirements for new mort-
gage purchases could be brought back to cur-
rent levels, perhaps under a gradual phase-in.
With or without modifying bank capital
requirements, freezing GSE purchases would
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serve to restructure the mortgage finance sys-
tem. The result would almost surely be an
industry that is much less concentrated than
the current duopoly. A housing finance sys-
tem that does not rely so heavily on Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae will be more robust.
There is no fool-proof system for handling
mortgage credit risk. We have to assume that
sooner or later some of the institutions
involved in mortgage finance will fail. The pol-
icy should be to promote a housing finance
system where mortgage risk is spread among
dozens of institutions. That way, the failure of
some firms can be resolved through mergers
and orderly restructuring, without exposing
the financial system to the sort of catastroph-
ic risk that is represented by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
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